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Abstract
Current IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are vulnerable
to session hijacking attacks as the existing standards
fail to address the lack of authentication of manage-
ment frames and network card addresses, and rely
on loosely coupled state machines. Even the new
WLAN security standard - IEEE 802.11i does not ad-
dress these issues. In our previous work, we proposed
two new techniques for improving detection of ses-
sion hijacking attacks that are passive, computation-
ally inexpensive, reliable, and have minimal impact
on network performance. These techniques utilise un-
spoofable characteristics from the MAC protocol and
the physical layer to enhance confidence in the in-
trusion detection process. This paper extends our
earlier work and explores usability, robustness and
accuracy of these intrusion detection techniques by
applying them to eight distinct test scenarios. A cor-
relation engine has also been introduced to maintain
the false positives and false negatives at a manage-
able level. We also explore the process of selecting
optimum thresholds for both detection techniques.
For the purposes of our experiments, Snort-Wireless
open source wireless intrusion detection system was
extended to implement these new techniques and the
correlation engine. Absence of any false negatives and
low number of false positives in all eight test scenar-
ios successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the
correlation engine and the accuracy of the detection
techniques.
Keywords: wireless intrusion detection, session hi-
jacking, received signal strength, round trip time, pas-
sive monitoring
1 Introduction
Session hijacking is a common and serious threat
to wireless local area network (WLAN) secu-
rity (Schmoyer, Lim & Owen 2004). This attack
exploits deficiencies in the WLAN state machine,
namely unauthenticated management frames and the
loose coupling of the IEEE 802.11i and IEEE 802.1X
state machines (Mishra & Arbaugh 2003), and can be
launched using off-the-shelf hardware and software.
Session hijacking combines denial of service (DoS)
and identity spoofing attacks. Typically an adver-
sary forces a legitimate mobile station (STA) to termi-
nate its connection to an access point (AP) by send-
ing it a disassociation/deauthentication management
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frame with the source MAC address spoofed to be
that of the AP. This results in the STA disconnecting
from the network. The adversary can now associate
with the AP, by masquerading the MAC address of
the STA, and hence taking over its session. Neither
the original IEEE 802.11 standards, nor the recent
IEEE 802.11i standard specify mechanisms for pro-
tecting the integrity of the management frames, leav-
ing IEEE 802.11 based WLANs vulnerable to man-
agement frame spoofing and the associated denial of
service attacks that such spoofing permits (Bellardo
& Savage 2003). In this paper the termsWireless and
Wireless Local Area Networks refer to IEEE 802.11
infrastructure networks (IEEE 1999).
This paper extends our earlier work (see Sec-
tion 2) on detecting session hijacking attacks in
WLANs (Gill, Smith, Looi & Clark 2005). In our
earlier paper, two new detection techniques were in-
troduced and some basic supporting experiments were
conducted to provide confidence in these techniques.
However, the experiments concentrated on establish-
ing that the techniques could maintain a manageable
false positive rate in the absence of an attacker. Ef-
fects of alert correlation and fine tuning of detection
thresholds (see Section 6.3) were not explored at all.
The contribution of this paper is that it addresses
these outstanding issues and demonstrates the accu-
racy and utility of the intrusion detection techniques
proposed in our earlier work through empirical data
and use of automated intrusion detection and cor-
relation techniques. To facilitate repeatability and
automation, the detection techniques and correlation
engine have been incorporated in - Snort-Wireless1,
an open source wireless intrusion detection system
(WIDS). The experimental scenarios have been de-
signed to study the effectiveness of the detection tech-
niques in the presence of an attacker, who launches an
active session hijacking attack on the legitimate STA.
The motivation for the scenarios was derived from ev-
eryday corporate office environment where fixed and
mobile wireless stations coexist. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of the correlation engine in dramatically
reducing the number of false positives and false neg-
atives. Each detection technique relies on a thresh-
old value which determines which measurement val-
ues are treated as anomalous (see Section 6.3). This
paper also investigates the effects of fine tuning these
thresholds on the number of false positives and false
negatives generated by each technique. Measures
have also been undertaken to improve the robustness
and reliability of the proposed detection techniques.
For example, unlike our earlier work, where the times-
tamp (time when the packet was received by the wire-
less card) information was derived from libpcap2, the
timestamp information is now derived directly from
the wireless network card hardware (see Section 3.1).
1http://snort-wireless.org
2http://www.tcpdump.org
To provide a reasonable degree of realism, these ex-
periments were carried out using real WLAN equip-
ment, with real network drivers and software. The
detection techniques were implemented as plugins in
Snort-Wireless. However, as these experiments are fo-
cused on detailed exploration and analysis, in favour
of flexibility and repeatability, real time detection
was avoided and the Snort-Wireless plugins were used
only to detect attacks from traffic captures. This al-
lowed repeated execution of the IDS plugins over the
same traffic captures and facilitated tweaking of the
plugin input parameters (threshold values) to study
the effects of these changes on intrusion detection re-
sults (i.e. the number of false positives and false neg-
atives).
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows.
The next section presents an overview of the existing
WLAN session hijacking detection techniques and re-
views the work presented in our previous paper (Gill
et al. 2005). Section 3 discusses the hardware and
software configuration for the experiments. The in-
dividual experiment scenarios are discussed in Sec-
tions 4 and 5. Section 6 presents an analysis of the
effectiveness of the detection techniques and the cor-
relation engine in detecting session hijacking attacks.
This section also discusses the process followed to dis-
cover optimum threshold values for both detection
techniques. Finally conclusions and future directions
for research are presented in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In our previous paper (Gill et al. 2005), we identified
that existing approaches for detecting session hijack-
ing attacks such as monitoring MAC frame sequence
numbers and MAC address authentication against
precompiled lists can easily be defeated. Ideally a
WIDS should utilise unspoofable characteristics from
the MAC protocol and the physical layer to enhance
confidence in the intrusion detection process. These
characteristics should be computationally inexpensive
to calculate, allowing them to be determined in a fast
and efficient manner. The WIDS should also oper-
ate in a passive fashion and not require modification
to the standards, wireless card drivers, or client op-
erating system or software. The WIDS should oper-
ate, without causing any interference to the live traffic
or network performance. As with all IDSs, a WIDS
should maintain minimum level of false positives and
negatives. Based on these requirements, two new in-
trusion detection techniques were proposed to detect
session hijacking attacks in WLANs: Monitoring Re-
ceived Signal Strength (RSS technique) and Monitor-
ing Round Trip Times of the Request to Send - Clear
to Send (RTS-CTS) Handshake (RTT technique).
Received signal strength (RSS) is a measure of the
energy observed by the physical layer at the antenna
of a receiver. Radio Frequency (RF) signal strength
does not fade in a linear manner, rather it attenuates
roughly inversely as the square of the distance be-
tween the two communicating nodes (Bardwell 2002).
From an intrusion detection perspective, this prop-
erty is valuable as it is unspoofable and computation-
ally inexpensive to measure. As it is calculated at the
receiver, it is also secure from eavesdropping. It is ex-
tremely difficult for an adversary to accurately guess
the RSS for a sender as perceived by a receiver. The
adversary will need to be at exactly the same location
as the receiver, use exactly the same radio equipment,
and receive the radio signal with same level of inter-
ference, reflections and refractions to know the precise
RSS value as perceived by the receiver. In the RSS in-
trusion detection technique, we proposed periodically
monitoring the RSS values for a particular STA or an
AP from a passive sensor and developing a dynamic
profile for the communicating nodes based on their
RSS values. Any abrupt or unusual changes could be
flagged as suspicious activity indicative of a poten-
tial session hijacking attack. The RSS profile would
be dynamic, in the sense that it would be rebuilt for
every session between two nodes and would be con-
stantly updated with newly observed RSS values for
each node per session.
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Figure 1: RTS-CTS Round Trip Time (RTT)
In WLANs, before starting transmission, the
sender can request positive control over the medium
by sending a Request to Send (RTS) frame to the
receiver. On receipt of the RTS frame, the receiver
sends a Clear to Send (CTS) frame as an acknowl-
edgment back to the receiver (IEEE 1999). The
sender can monitor the time taken for completion of
the RTS-CTS handshake between itself and the re-
ceiver, Timertts . This RTS-CTS handshake between
two communicating nodes can also be monitored us-
ing a passive sensor. Let Timerttm be the time elapsed
between when the sensor first detected a RTS frame
from the sender to the receiver and when it detected
a return CTS from the receiver back to the sender
(see Figure 1). This observed RTS-CTS round trip
time (Timerttm ) is an unspoofable parameter relative
to its measuring entity (i.e. the passive sensor). Its
value cannot be guessed by an adversary as it de-
pends on the position of the receiver and the sensor,
the distance between the sensor and the receiver and
the environment around the receiver and the sensor.
It is a measurement relative to the entity measuring
it and hence the adversary will have to be at exactly
the same location as the sender, using exactly the
same radio equipment with same attenuation and an-
tenna gain and receiving the radio waves after same
number of reflections and refractions as the sender to
accurately predict the values of Timerttm between two
communicating nodes. It is also protected from eaves-
dropping as it is a property that is calculated at the
passive sensor. In the Round Trip Time (RTT) intru-
sion detection technique, we proposed that changes
in observed time taken for a RTS-CTS handshake to
complete between two communicating nodes can be
monitored per session by a passive sensor and any
abrupt fluctuations can be flagged as suspicious.
In this paper, we extend our previous work by im-
plementing automated IDS plugins to detect anoma-
lies and raise alerts based on RSS and RTT detec-
tion techniques. We apply the detection techniques
to eight different scenarios to extensively test their
usability and accuracy. We study the effects of alert
correlation on the number of false positives and false
negatives and explore the process of discovering opti-
mum threshold values for the detection techniques.
3 Equipment And Preparation
The experiments were carried out in a lab environ-
ment. The same networking hardware/software was
used in all experiment scenarios. The following four
parties took part in the scenarios: a legitimate client
(STA), an access point (AP), a passive Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) sensor and an attacker. The AP
and the IDS sensor were always stationary in these
experiments. However depending on the mobility of
the STA, the experiments were divided into two dis-
tinct sets. In Set 1, all parties were stationary and
in Set 2 the STA was in motion. When in motion,
the STA traveled at walking speed, moving across
walls, doors and other physical obstacles. In all these
experiments, both Snort-Wireless plugin thresholds
were set to an arbitrary value of 5 (see Section 6.3 for
details). Threshold optimisation was later explored
in Section 6.3 to minimise the number of false pos-
itives and false negatives. Although the detection
techniques proposed in our earlier work (see Section
2) can be used to monitor intrusions against both the
AP and the STA, these experiments only deal with
session hijacking attacks on the STA.
3.1 IDS Sensor
A Prism2 chipset based IDS sensor was used in all
the experiments as it enables access to physical layer
header, called Prism monitoring header (PMH)3 in
Radio Frequency Monitoring (RFMON) mode. RF-
MON mode allows the wireless card to passively mon-
itor all WLAN traffic without any active participa-
tion in the network. When Prism cards/drivers re-
ceive a wireless frame in RFMON mode, they add
their own diagnostics header (PMH) to the frame
before passing it over to higher layers for process-
ing. The PMH is not a part of the standard IEEE
802.11 frame header, but is generated by the firmware
of the receiving card. It is never actually transmit-
ted and is only used by the receiver for diagnostics.
This header includes useful information like host time
(timestamp when the packet was retrieved from card
buffer), MACtime (timestamp when the packet was
received by the card), data rate (Rate at which this
packet was received in Mbps), RSSI (Received Sig-
nal Strength Indication), Signal strength and Noise,
Signal quality etc (Yeo, Banerjee & Agrawala 2002).
However, most of the PMH measurements (such as
signal strength) do not seem to be in standard units,
instead they appear to be vendor specific representa-
tions of measurements. However they are still useful
from the perspective of a comparative study.
3.2 Snort-Wireless Plugins
The Snort-Wireless plugins developed for these exper-
iments use the PMH to detect anomalies in observed
RSS or RTT values for a particular MAC address.
The Signal Strength field in the PMH is used by the
RSS plugin to register the observed RSS values for
a particular MAC address. The RSS plugin observes
RSS for every wireless frame received, keeps a record
of the last observed RSS value per MAC address and
checks if the absolute difference between the new ob-
served RSS value for that MAC address and the last
one is above a pre-determined threshold (which is con-
figurable). If the threshold is exceeded, then it reg-
isters an anomaly in the RSS profile for that MAC
address. Similarly, the RTT plugin uses the MAC-
time field (64 bits in length with a resolution of one
3http://www.ecsl.cs.sunysb.edu/cse591/RFMon.pdf
microsecond4) in the PMH of the received RTS and
CTS frames to calculate the round trip time (RTT)
taken to complete the RTS-CTS handshake between
the AP and the STA (Timerttm ). When the plugin de-
tects a RTS frame, it stores its MACtime field value
along with the MAC address of the destination and
then waits for a CTS frame back from that MAC ad-
dress. When the return CTS frame is detected from
the same MAC address, the RTT plugin calculates
the RTT by subtracting the stored MACtime value
of the RTS frame from the MACtime of the CTS
frame. For every MAC address, the RTT plugin also
stores the last observed RTT. Hence when a RTS-
CTS event occurs, the plugin calculates the RTT for
that MAC address and then compares it against the
last observed RTT for that MAC address. If the ab-
solute difference between the two values is more than
a pre-determined threshold (which is configurable), it
registers an anomaly in the RTT profile for that MAC
address. The thresholds of the detection techniques
are independent of each other and one can be set to
a different value from the other.
Since both the RSS and the RTT measurements
are derived from the values registered by the network-
ing hardware in its firmware, these measurements are
of maximum possible accuracy that the hardware of-
fers. This factor is especially relevant to RTT mea-
surements. The MACtime field represents the time
the WLAN hardware actually detected the frame and
does not depend on the driver or the operating sys-
tem or the hardware of the computing platform its
attached to. Hence the RTT measurements are not
corrupted by interrupt delays and operating system
processing queue lengths etc.
3.3 Correlation Engine
In favour of more reliable intrusion detection, the RSS
and RTT detection techniques were not used in iso-
lation from each other. Rather results from both the
techniques were correlated to provide more confidence
in the generated alarms. The correlation engine used
is event based i.e. if one of the detection techniques
detect an anomaly (an alert), the correlation engine
activates and waits until it obtains the detection re-
sults from the other technique before making a de-
cision on whether to raise an alarm or not. If both
the techniques detected the anomaly, then and only
then is an alarm raised (See Figure 2 for correlation
engine state machine). For instance if the RSS de-
tection technique registers an abrupt spike in RSS
value for a particular MAC address, the correlation
engine would register this and then wait for the next
RTS-CTS event for this MAC address and check the
results of the RTT detection technique. If both tech-
niques registered an alert for that MAC address, then
an alarm would be raised. All the RSS events, that
occur while the correlation engine is waiting for the
RTT technique’s results, have no affect on the out-
come. An alarm is only raised if both techniques reg-
ister an alert. Similarly if the RTT technique detects
that the RTT taken by the RTS-CTS frames for a par-
ticular MAC address has suffered a rapid surge, the
correlation engine waits for the next RSS event and
only raises an alarm if the RSS technique also regis-
ters a spike in the RSS value for that MAC address.
The RTS-CTS events for that MAC address, while
the correlation engine is waiting for an RSS event,
are ignored for the purposes of intrusion detection.
In a real world deployment, the Snort-Wireless
plugins would be implemented in the passive IDS sen-
sor and the correlation engine would exist in a central
4http://lists.shmoo.com/pipermail/hostap/2003-
November/004821.html
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Figure 2: Correlation Engine State Machine
IDS control station. Hence real time attack detection
would be possible. In this paper, our aim is to estab-
lish the accuracy and usability of the detection tech-
niques and the correlation engine via repeatable and
controlled experiments. Therefore, for the purposes of
this paper, the passive IDS sensor is only used to cre-
ate traffic capture dumps. The Snort-Wireless code,
implementing the RSS and RTT detection techniques
and the correlation engine, is then executed over the
offline traffic captures to detect session hijacking at-
tacks.
3.4 Hardware Configuration
A Linksys WRT54g router with sveasoft5 firmware
was used as the AP. A laptop with Dlink DWL-650
card, running linux hostap6 driver on Redhat 9 was
used as the attacker and a laptop with Orinoco sil-
ver card, running orinoco inbuilt driver on Redhat 9
was used as the STA. A Pentium II PC with Netgear
MA401 card, running linux hostap driver on Redhat
9 was used in RFMON mode as the IDS sensor (ethe-
real7 was used for frame capturing). The WRT54g
router’s RTSThreshold option was set to 1 (always
on). This enabled RTS-CTS handshake for traffic
from AP to STA. No external antennas were used to
enhance the reception and no attempt was made to
modify the transmission power of any of the wireless
equipment.
4 Experimentation - Set 1
In Set 1 of the experiments, the robustness and relia-
bility of the RTT and RSS detection techniques was
tested when none of the participants were in motion.
The AP, the IDS sensor, the STA and the attacker
were all stationary in this set. In all scenarios, the
AP was placed in close proximity to the IDS sensor.
In Figure 3, points A, B and C represent location
of the STA, the AP and the IDS sensor respectively.
Points X,Y and Z in Figure 4 represent location of
the attacker in Scenarios Two, Three and Four re-
spectively.
5http://www.sveasoft.com
6http://hostap.epitest.fi
7http://www.ethereal.com
4.1 Scenario One
In Scenario One, there was no attacker present and
the AP and the STA were placed in close proxim-
ity to each other at points B and A respectively (see
Figure 3). Network traffic was generated from the
STA to the AP. The IDS sniffer was used to cap-
ture this WLAN traffic between the STA and the AP.
Snort-Wireless, with the RSS and RTT plugins acti-
vated, was then run over this traffic capture dump.
After examination of 1221 captured frames, Snort-
Wireless plugins did not raise any alarms. As there
was no attacker present, the detection techniques and
the correlation engine correctly did not generate any
false positives. An analysis of the Snort-Wireless de-
bug logs also indicated that there were no instances
where any one of the two detection techniques dis-
agreed with the other one. Neither of them detected
any anomaly at any time.
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Figure 3: Scenario One
4.2 Scenario Two
In Scenario Two, the AP and the STA were placed
in close proximity to each other at points B and A
respectively. The attacker was placed in line of sight
of the STA at point X (see Figure 4). Then network
traffic was generated between the STA and the AP.
The attacker then launched a session hijacking attack
on the STA.
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Figure 4: Scenarios Two, Three and Four
Session hijacking attacks are a combination of de-
nial of service (DoS) and identity spoofing attacks.
In the real world, a DoS attack would be carried out
using a deauthentication attack tool like void11 8 and
then spoofing attack would involve simply changing
the MAC address of the attacker to the STA’s MAC
address using the ifconfig command. However, for
the purposes of this paper, to facilitate pinpointing
the frame where session hijacking attack started, the
DoS attack was simulated by manually switching off
the STA. Then the attacker initiated communication
with the AP using its own MAC address. All this
traffic was captured by the passive IDS sensor. The
spoofing part of the attack was simulated by editing
the traffic capture dump before passing it on to Snort-
Wireless and changing all instances of the attacker’s
original MAC address to the STA’s MAC address.
An analysis of the traffic capture revealed that
the session hijacking attack started at frame number
1191. This was the first frame with original source
MAC address of the attacker (00:05:5d:ee:1f:3a) in
the captured traffic dump. Then using a combina-
tion of ethereal, sed9 and text2pcap10 tools, the cap-
tured traffic dump was edited and all instances of the
attacker’s MAC address were replaced by the STA’s
MAC address. Hence simulating the spoofing attack
in the captured traffic dump. Therefore, now the
captured traffic dump file contained a session hijack-
ing attack starting at frame number 1191. All traffic
with STA’s source MAC address (00:02:2d:2b:9f:d9 )
after frame 1190 was from the attacker. Now Snort-
Wireless (with RSS and RTT plugins activated) was
run over the captured traffic dump. Executing mod-
ified Snort-Wireless over the edited traffic capture
(2167 frames) resulted in two alarms.
4.3 Scenario Three
In Scenario Three, the AP and the STA were placed
in close proximity to each other at points B and A re-
spectively. The attacker was placed away from of the
STA, in a different room, with no line of sight to the
STA (at point Y in Figure 4). Then in exactly similar
fashion to Scenario Two (see Section 4.2), the remain-
der of the experiment was conducted. After editing
the captured traffic dump and running Snort-Wireless
over 2258 captured frames, three alarms were gener-
ated.
4.4 Scenario Four
In Scenario Four, the AP and the STA were placed
in close proximity to each other at points B and A
respectively. The attacker was placed very far away
from of the STA (close to the RF range limit of the
AP), in a different building, with no line of sight to
the STA (at point Z in Figure 4). The remainder of
the experiment was conducted in similar fashion to
Scenario Two (Section 4.2). After editing the traffic
dump and running modified Snort-Wireless over 2005
captured frames, two alarms were registered.
5 Experimentation - Set 2
In Set 2 of the experiments, the robustness and relia-
bility of the RTT and RSS detection techniques was
tested with the attacker stationary and the STA in
motion between a point closer to the AP and another
point far away from it. The AP, the IDS sensor, and
the attacker were all stationary at locations B, C and
8http://www.wlsec.net/void11
9http://www.gnu.org/software/sed/manual/html mono/sed.html
10http://www.ethereal.com/docs/man-pages/text2pcap.1.html
D (see Figures 5 and 6). In all scenarios, the IDS
sensor was placed in close proximity to the AP. The
equipment setup was exactly as described in Section
3.
5.1 Scenario Five
In Scenario Five, the AP and the attacker were sta-
tionary and were placed in close proximity to each
other (in line of sight at points B and D in Figure 5).
Network traffic was then generated from the STA to
the AP. The STA then started traveling (at walking
pace) from a point close to the AP to a point far
away from it (i.e. from point E to F in Figure 5).
Towards the end of the STA’s journey, the attacker
then launched a session hijacking attack on the STA.
The steps taken to simulate the session hijacking at-
tack were same as described in Section 4.2. Executing
modified Snort-Wireless over the edited traffic cap-
ture (1590 frames) resulted in one alarm.
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Figure 5: Scenarios Five and Six
5.2 Scenario Six
In Scenario Six, the AP and the attacker were sta-
tionary and were placed in close proximity to each
other (in line of sight at points B and D in Figure 5).
Network traffic was then generated from the STA to
the AP. The STA then started traveling (at walking
pace) from a point far away from the AP to a point
close to it (i.e. from point F to E in Figure 5). To-
wards the end of the STA’s journey, the attacker then
launched a session hijacking attack on the STA. The
session hijacking attack was simulated in exactly the
same fashion as described in Section 4.2. Executing
modified Snort-Wireless over the edited traffic cap-
ture (1562 frames) resulted in two alarms.
5.3 Scenario Seven
In Scenario Seven, the AP and the attacker were sta-
tionary and were placed far way from each other (not
in line of sight, at points B and D in Figure 6). Net-
work traffic was then generated from the STA to the
AP. The STA then started traveling (at walking pace)
from a point at close proximity to the AP to a point
far away from it (i.e. from point E to F in Fig-
ure 6). Towards the end of the STA’s journey, the
attacker then launched a session hijacking attack on
the STA. The steps taken to simulate the session hi-
jacking attack were same as described in Section 4.2.
After editing the capture dump and running modi-
fied Snort-Wireless over 1513 captured frames, only
one alarm was raised.
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Figure 6: Scenarios Seven and Eight
5.4 Scenario Eight
In Scenario Eight, the AP and the attacker were sta-
tionary and were placed far way from each other (not
in line of sight, at points B and D in Figure 6). Net-
work traffic was then generated from the STA to the
AP. The STA then started traveling (at walking pace)
from a point far away from the AP to a point close to
it (i.e. from point F to E in Figure 6). Towards the
end of the STA’s journey, the attacker then launched
a session hijacking attack on the STA. The session hi-
jacking attack was simulated in exactly the same fash-
ion as described in Section 4.2. Executing modified
Snort-Wireless over the edited traffic capture (3135
frames) resulted in two alarms.
6 Analysis
6.1 True Positives and False Positives
A true positive is the alarm raised when an IDS cor-
rectly identifies an abnormal event as an attack, while
a false positive is the alarm raised when an IDS mis-
classifies a normal event as an attack. A false nega-
tive is just the opposite of a true positive where the
IDS fails to identify the attack and does not raise
an alarm. In our experiments, no false negatives were
registered i.e. all the attacks were successfully and ac-
curately detected. However some false positives were
also raised by the correlation engine.
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the true positives and
false positives raised by the correlation engine in all
eight scenarios. Column one is the scenario number
and column two is the number of true positives/false
positives raised in that scenario along with the RSS-
diff11 and RTTdiff12 values that triggered the alarm.
11RSSdiff is the absolute difference between the last observed
and the current RSS value for a MAC address
12RTTdiff is the absolute difference between the last observed
and the current RTT value for a MAC address
Column three represents the frame numbers (in the
captured traffic dumps per scenario), where the RSS
and the RTT anomalies occurred. In column three,
the frame numbers are represented by a tuple where
the first member of the tuple represents the frame
number in the captured traffic dump where the RSS
alert was registered and the second member is the
frame number where the RTT alert was raised. For
instance, the entry for Scenario Two in Tables 1 and 2
shows that in Scenario Two, 2 alarms were raised by
the correlation engine. The first one at frame 1217
and the second one at frame 1400. The alarm at frame
1217 was caused by a RSS fluctuation (RSSdiff=24)
at frame 1191 and a RTT spike at frame 1217 (RTTd-
iff=147) for the STA. Frame 1217 was the very next
RTS-CTS handshake event for the STA after frame
1191. Hence, both the RSS and the RTT plugins re-
ported the anomaly and the session hijacking attack
was identified correctly and accurately. However the
alarm raised at frame 1400 was a false positive. It
was caused by a RSS spike (RSSdiff=20) generated
at frame 1397 and a RTT fluctuation at frame 1400
(RTTdiff=132).
Scenario Number of Frame
True Positives numbers
One NA NA
Two 1 (RSSdiff=24) (1191 1217)
(RTTdiff=147)
Three 1 (RSSdiff=37) (845 866)
(RTTdiff=152)
Four 1 (RSSdiff=44) (909 912)
(RTTdiff=161)
Five 1 (RSSdiff=34) (842 870)
(RTTdiff=159)
Six 1 (RSSdiff=16) (681 735)
(RTTdiff=130)
Seven 1 (RSSdiff=22) (966 980)
(RTTdiff=143)
Eight 1 (RSSdiff=36) (702 705)
(RTTdiff=167)
Table 1: True Positives
Scenario Number of Frame
False Positives numbers
One NONE NA
Two 1 (RSSdiff=20) (1397 1400)
(RTTdiff=132)
Three 2 (RSSdiff=15) (1067 1400)
(RTTdiff=105)
and and
(RSSdiff=18) (1410 1414)
(RTTdiff=122)
Four 1 (RSSdiff=13) (1099 1106)
(RTTdiff=114)
Five NONE NA
Six 1 (RSSdiff=8) (318 332)
(RTTdiff=64)
Seven NONE NA
Eight 1 (RSSdiff=7) (283 296)
(RTTdiff=131)
Table 2: False Positives
In all scenarios, the first alert raised was the RSS
alert followed by the RTT alert. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that the number of RSS events in
a traffic capture are higher than the RTS-CTS events
and the attacker never starts the session hijacking at-
tack with a RTS-CTS handshake. The attacker will
always send a spoofed frame to the AP, leading to
a RSS event first. The response transmission from
the AP initiates a RTS-CTS handshake, enabling the
passive monitor to take the RTT reading for the at-
tacker. Hence the RSS detection technique always
detects the session hijacking attack before the RTT
technique. Tables 1 and 2 also show that the RTTdiff
values in all alarms are higher than the correspond-
ing RSSdiff values. This is most likely a result of the
higher resolution of the MACtime field as compared
to the Signal Strength field in the PMH.
An interesting observation was made that in Sce-
narios Two, Three and Four, where all parties were
stationary, all the false positives were detected in
frames generated after the attack had commenced.
This meant that all the false positives were caused
by abnormal fluctuations in observed RSS and RTT
values for the attacker. This observation was most
likely the result of increasing distance between the
attacker and the passive IDS monitor from Scenar-
ios Two to Four. Lack of line of sight connectivity
and presence of various obstacles (walls, doors etc.)
most likely acted as contributing factors to random
fluctuations in observed RSS and RTT values for the
attacker. Being positioned in close proximity of the
sensor in all these scenarios, the STA did not suffer
such random fluctuations and hence did not generate
any false positives before the attack was launched.
Scenario Frame Number the
Attack Started at
One NA
Two 1191
Three 845
Four 909
Five 842
Six 681
Seven 966
Eight 702
Table 3: Frame Number at which the Session Hijack-
ing Attack Commenced
However, in Scenarios Six and Eight, just the op-
posite was observed. The false positives were de-
tected in frames generated before the attack had com-
menced, which means that the source of these abnor-
malities was the STA and not the attacker. In these
scenarios, the attacker was always stationary and the
STA was in motion. These false positives can be at-
tributed to the fluctuations in observed RSS and RTT
values for the STA as a result of it being in motion.
Despite different factors contributing to false
alarms in different scenarios, the correlation tech-
nique successfully managed to keep the number of
these false positives fairly low. No false positives
were registered in Scenarios One, Five and Seven
and almost all other scenarios registered only one
false positive (see Table 2). The detection techniques
successfully detected the session hijacking attacks in
Scenarios Two to Eight at the precise moment (i.e.
frame numbers) when they were launched (see Ta-
bles 3 and 1). Hence there were no false negatives.
In Scenarios One to Four, as expected, the RSSd-
iff and RTTdiff values increased as the attacker was
placed further away from the STA. In Scenarios Five
and Six, the AP, the IDS sensor and the attacker were
located in close proximity of each other and as ex-
pected, the RSSdiff and RTTdiff values increased as
STA moved away from them and decreased as STA
moved closer. In Scenarios Seven and Eight, the at-
tacker was located further away from the IDS sensor
and the AP. The observed RTTdiff and RSSdiff val-
ues increased as STA moved away from the attacker,
and decreased as it moved closer to the attacker (see
Table 1).
6.2 Single Anomalies
Analysis of the Snort-Wireless debug logs indicated
that there were instances when the two detection
techniques disagreed with each other. In this pa-
per, we refer to these disagreements as single anoma-
lies. A single anomaly would occur if a RSS alert
was registered by the RSS detection technique, how-
ever the RTT plugin did not register an anomaly in
the next RTS-CTS event for that MAC address. An-
other example would be if a RTT alert was raised by
the RTT plugin but the next RSS reading for that
MAC address was under the threshold. A detection
technique will only raise an alert if the difference be-
tween the last observed and current characteristic is
above a threshold. In these experiments, both Snort-
Wireless plugin thresholds were set to an arbitrary
value of 5 (see Section 6.3 for details). Single anoma-
lies are ignored by the correlation engine and an alarm
is only raised if both the detection techniques register
an alert.
Table 4 shows the observed single anomalies in
each scenario and demonstrates the number of poten-
tial false positives per scenario that were successfully
avoided by the correlation technique. In Table 4 the
single anomaly values have been represented as the
tuple (RSSdiff RTTdiff). The single anomaly values
in RSS single anomaly column have their RSSdiff val-
ues greater than the RSSdiff threshold i.e. 5 (see Sec-
tion 6.3) and the RTTdiff values lower than or equal
to the RTTdiff threshold i.e. 5. Similarly the single
anomaly values in RTT single anomaly column have
their RTTdiff values greater than the RTTdiff thresh-
old and the RSSdiff values lower than or equal to the
RSSdiff threshold. The number of single anomalies
is a direct function of the threshold values chosen for
each detection technique. As expected, both the RSS
and RTT single anomalies increased in number in the
last four scenarios, due to the mobility of the STA
(see Table 4).
Figure 7 shows the distribution of single anomalies
registered by the RSS and the RTT plugins, where
the correlation engine did not raise an alarm, even
though an anomaly was detected by at least one of
the plugins. In Figure 7, Quadrant B represents all
readings where the observed RTTdiff is greater than
the RTTdiff threshold and the observed RSSdiff is
lower than or equal to the RSSdiff threshold. While
Quadrant D represents the readings where the ob-
served RSSdiff is greater than the RSSdiff threshold
and the RTTdiff is lower than or equal to the RTTdiff
threshold.
All RTT single anomalies lie in Quadrant B and all
RSS single anomalies in Quadrant D. Table 4 and Fig-
ure 7 show that the number of single RSS anomalies
per scenario were higher than RTT single anomalies.
This demonstrates the usability of the correlation pro-
cess where the RSS technique, used on its own, would
have generated lot more false positives. All single
anomalies in each scenario were correctly processed
by the correlation engine and silently ignored. This
contributed to maintaining a low number of false pos-
itives.
6.3 Threshold Optimisation
In all these experiments, thresholds for both the de-
tection techniques were set to an arbitrary value of
5. This means a RSS anomaly was only registered if
Scenario RSS Single RTT Single
Anomaly Anomaly
Values Values
One NONE NONE
Two (9 2), (7 1) (3 32)
Three (20 3), (23 2), (1 24), (2 7)
(28 1), (6 0)
(9 4), (13 2),
(9 1)
Four NONE NONE
Five (8 3), (6 0), (3 51), (3 43),
(9 1), (7 3), (1 22)
(8 2), (9 4),
(11 1), (12 0),
(10 3)
Six (8 4), (15 1), (2 17), (1 14),
(9 3), (10 2) (3 19), (0 15),
(6 1) (2 21), (3 33),
(4 24), (4 27)
Seven (16 4), (6 2), (1 31), (3 33),
(9 0), (9 3), (1 24), (0 18),
(12 2), (11 1), (2 17)
(8 0), (12 1),
(11 0), (10 2),
(13 0)
Eight (11 0), (9 1), (2 23), (1 17),
(6 0), (9 3), (4 21), (3 27),
(7 4), (8 4), (3 13), (3 26),
(17 0), (13 2), (1 11), (1 16)
(12 0) (8 0)
Table 4: Single Anomalies
RSSdiff was greater than 5 and a RTT anomaly was
only acknowledged if RTTdiff value was greater than
5. An alarm was raised by the correlation engine only
when both the RSSdiff and RTTdiff thresholds were
exceeded. Setting the threshold value for each plugin
is really just an educated guess followed by empirical
fine tuning. The threshold value 5 was thought to
be just low enough to avoid a high number of false
negatives and just high enough to avoid a large vol-
ume of false positives. And since ideally both the
techniques should exhibit the same level of accuracy,
the same threshold value was used for both. In this
experiment both the thresholds were set to the same
value, however this was purely coincidental and there
is no requirement on the RTTdiff and RSSdiff thresh-
olds to be set to the same value. In the real world,
after arbitrarily choosing the thresholds for each tech-
nique individually, the number of false positives and
false negatives generated would be monitored for that
particular deployment. After analysing the generated
alarms, fine tuning of the threshold values would be
undertaken to maintain lowest number of false posi-
tives and false negatives.
From Table 2, it is clear that most of the false pos-
itives can be eliminated by fine tuning the RTTdiff
and RSSdiff threshold values. Table 5 demonstrates
how this tuning of the RTTdiff and RSSdiff thresh-
old values would affect the number of false positives
and false negatives. In Table 5, threshold values have
been represented as a tuple where first member of the
tuple represents the RSSdiff threshold and the sec-
ond one is the RTTdiff threshold. Starting with re-
laxed threshold values like RSSdiff threshold of 6 and
RTTdiff threshold of 7, we notice a high number of
false positives and no false negatives. As the thresh-
old values go higher, the number of false negatives
start to increase and the number of false positives
start to decrease. If we raise the RSSdiff threshold
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Figure 7: Overview of Alarms and Single Anomalies
in All Scenarios
to 20 and RTTdiff threshold to 132, we eliminate all
false positives. However, these new threshold values
also introduce one false negative. With these thresh-
old values, the true positive in Scenario Six would
not get raised (see Table 1). As the thresholds get
stricter (higher values), the number of false negatives
increase rapidly and the number of false positives are
reduced to zero. Higher threshold values tend to lead
to more false negatives and lower threshold values re-
sult in more false positives (see Table 5). Hence fine
tuning of the threshold values has to be a balance be-
tween the need for detecting every session hijacking
attack (i.e. security sensitivity) and accepted security
risk. For single sensor based IDS systems, discovering
appropriate threshold values for a particular site can
take some time and effort.
Threshold Number of Number of
False Negatives False Positives
(6 7) 0 6
(7 14) 0 5
(12 24) 0 4
(13 26) 0 3
(15 105) 0 2
(16 28) 1 2
(19 30) 1 1
(20 132) 1 0
(22 140) 2 0
(24 146) 3 0
(28 154) 4 0
(34 159) 5 0
(40 160) 6 0
(50 200) 7 0
(10 170) 7 0
(150 150) 7 0
Table 5: Threshold Fine Tuning
From intrusion detection perspective, it is far more
critical for an IDS to minimize the false negative rate
than to maintain a low false positive rate. The cost of
missing an attack is much higher than the cost of rais-
ing a false alarm. Figure 8 shows the ROC13 curve for
the correlation technique used in this paper. It plots
the true positive rate of detection against the corre-
sponding false positive rate of error. When relaxed
thresholds are employed, the rate of true positives
and false positives is high. For instance, at RTTdiff
13Receiver Operating Characteristic
threshold of 1 and RSSdiff threshold of 1, the rate
of false positives and true positives is 100 %. As the
thresholds are raised, the false positive rate starts de-
creasing. At RSSdiff threshold set to 15 and RTTdiff
threshold at 105, the false positive rate drops to low-
est 16.67 % while still achieving 100 % true positive
rate. If the threshold are raised further, the true posi-
tive rate starts decreasing along with the false positive
rate and hence leading to false negatives. At RSSd-
iff threshold of 22 and RTTdiff threshold of 140, the
false positive rate hits zero with a true positive rate
of 77.4%. Increasing the thresholds to more stricter
values introduces more false negatives by decreasing
the true positive rate, while the false positive rate
stays at zero. Finally at high thresholds like RSSdiff
threshold of 50 and RTTdiff threshold of 200, both
the true positive rate and false negative rate become
zero i.e. IDS becomes unable to detect any attacks
with false negative rate of 100 %.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
False Positive Rate
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve
Relaxed Thresholds
Moderate Thresholds
Stricter Thresholds
[15 105] [1 1]
[22 140]
[50 200]
Figure 8: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Curve
The effects of changes in threshold values on false
positives and false negatives have been illustrated in
Table 5 and Figure 8. Choosing optimum RSSdiff
and RTTdiff threshold values requires analysing the
single anomalies, false positives and true positives to
select values that minimize the number of false posi-
tives and maximize the number of true positives while
preventing the single anomalies from becoming false
positives. Figure 7 and Figure 9 together present a
visual technique to aid in choosing optimum RSSdiff
and RTTdiff thresholds.
Figure 7 represents the true positives, false posi-
tives and single anomalies registered by the IDS when
using the initial threshold settings. In Figure 7, RSS-
diff Base Threshold and RTTdiff Base Threshold re-
fer to initial values used for thresholds (i.e. 5 for
all scenarios presented in this paper). Quadrant B
represents all readings where the observed RTTdiff
is greater than the RTTdiff Base Threshold and the
observed RSSdiff is lower than or equal to the RSS-
diff Base Threshold. While Quadrant D represents
the readings where the observed RSSdiff is greater
than the RSSdiff Base Threshold and the RTTdiff is
lower than or equal to the RTTdiff Base Threshold.
Quadrant A represents those readings where both the
RTTdiff and RSSdiff values are greater than their
thresholds. This quadrant contains all the alarms i.e.
true positives and false positives. Lastly Quadrant C
represents all normal readings where neither RSSd-
iff nor RTTdiff reading is above the threshold. Fig-
ure 9 represents the true positives, false positives and
single anomalies registered by the IDS when using
the optimum threshold settings. In Figure 9, RSSdiff
Optimum Threshold and RTTdiff Optimum Thresh-
old refer to fine tuned optimum values of RSSdiff
and RTTdiff thresholds respectively. These values are
chosen to minimize the number of false positives and
false negatives. The Quadrants in Figure 9 are same
as in Figure 7, however their areas have changed with
the new threshold values.
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Table 5 and the ROC curve (Figure 8) clearly
demonstrate that RSSdiff threshold of 15 and RTTdiff
threshold of 105 is the optimum choice for the thresh-
olds of the detection techniques. RSSdiff Optimum
Threshold=5 and RTTdiff Optimum Threshold=105
generates no false negatives and raises only two false
positives. Figure 9 shows how the single anomalies,
false positives and true positives get affected by the
new optimum threshold values. As a result of the
new thresholds, out of total six false positives, three
became RTT single anomalies and moved into Quad-
rant B and one moved to Quadrant C and got reduced
to a normal event. The new thresholds did not in-
troduce any false negatives, that is no true positives
were moved out of Quadrant A. None of the single
anomalies got moved into Quadrant A, which means
that no single anomaly was converted into a false pos-
itive as a result of the new threshold. As a result of
new thresholds, some of the single anomalies (both
RSS and RTT single anomalies) moved to Quadrant
C, that is, they became normal events. Hence with
100% true positive detection and four less false posi-
tives, RSSdiff Optimum Threshold of 5 and RTTdiff
Optimum Threshold of 105 prove to be the optimum
threshold values for the test scenarios presented in
this paper. Figure 9, therefore helps in understand-
ing the effects of the new threshold values on single
anomalies and the generated alarms (false positives
and true positives) and hence assists in choosing op-
timum thresholds.
The accuracy and efficiency of the IDS depends
solely on the choice of suitable threshold values
and hence places a large expectation on the thresh-
old values to be optimally tuned. Using a dis-
tributed approach, by deploying multiple distributed
co-operating IDS sensors, can decrease this expecta-
tion on the accuracy of the threshold values. Rather
than relying on the alarms generated by a single IDS
sensor, the intrusion detection process can be en-
hanced by using a distributed architecture for IDS
sensors. The distributed sensors would report alarms
to a central control authority, where the correlation
engine would use input from all the sensors to make
intrusion detection decisions. The false positives gen-
erated can easily be eliminated using the correlation
process by simply comparing alarms from different
sensors. This also makes it much harder a job for the
attacker to launch a session hijacking attack as they
will have to guess and spoof RSS and RTT values of
the legitimate STA as observed by each sensor. This
will require the attacker to be at multiple locations
at the same time, hence making it very hard for the
attacker to launch an undetected attack.
7 Conclusions And Future Work
Absence of false negatives and a low number of false
positives in all our experiments have successfully
demonstrated the accuracy, robustness and usabil-
ity of the RSS and RTT detection techniques and
the event based correlation engine (see Section 6).
Both the detection techniques accurately and pre-
cisely detected the session hijacking attacks at the
correct frame numbers and hence proved to be reli-
able and effective. However, accuracy of the detec-
tion techniques depends upon selection of appropri-
ate threshold values. Low threshold values tend to re-
sult in a greater volume of false positives while higher
threshold values lead to more false negatives. These
threshold values vary from site to site and can only
be determined through appropriate testing and exper-
imentation. In Section 6.3, we explored the system-
atic process of discovering the optimum thresholds
and also presented a graphical technique to assist in
selecting optimum threshold values for the detection
techniques based on empirical data.
The event based correlation engine used in this pa-
per proved to be very effective in retaining the num-
ber of false positives to a minimum. It only raises
an alarm if it registers alerts from both the detection
techniques. In absence of the correlation engine, all
the single anomalies in Section 6.2 would have been
raised as false positives. Therefore, it can be of great
assistance in avoiding a storm of false positives when
one of the detection techniques has been misconfig-
ured with a very low threshold.
However, by its very nature, the event based model
is prone to delay in detection of the attacks. No deci-
sion can be made until results from both the RSS and
the RTT detection techniques are available. The ulti-
mate goal of intrusion detection process is to improve
the correlation process to eliminate all false positives
and false negatives and provide fast and accurate at-
tack detection. One alternative is to use a time pe-
riod based correlation technique, where rather than
waiting for the next RSS/RTS-CTS event after an
anomaly, the correlation engine makes a decision ei-
ther way after expiry of a pre-determined time period.
When used on its own, it might not be very effective
and might lead to many more false positives and nega-
tives. However, if used together, event based and time
period based correlation techniques might be able to
provide faster and more accurate detection of session
hijacking attacks. In this improved technique, if the
pre-determined time period has expired and the next
event has not happened yet to enable event based
correlation engine to make a decision on the alarm,
an alarm is raised anyway and later verified by the
event based engine when the result of the next event
is available. If the next event is not an anomaly then
the IDS can withdraw its alarm and indicate so in the
logs.
Session hijacking attacks are combination of DoS
and identity spoofing attacks where the first step in-
volves the attacker spoofing the MAC address of the
AP and sending a deauthentication frame to the le-
gitimate STA, forcing it to terminate its connection
to the AP. The attacker then spoofs the MAC ad-
dress of the STA to communicate with the AP. This
sequence of events can also be used to eliminate some
of the false positives. When an alarm is reported for
a MAC address, the correlation engine can check if a
RSS anomaly was registered for the AP just before
the reported alarm. This anomaly would exist as a
result of the attacker spoofing AP’s MAC address to
send deauthentication frame to the STA.
In our future work, we plan to extend these ex-
periments and study the RSS and RTT intrusion de-
tection techniques in a network with multiple dis-
tributed, co-operating IDS sensors. Each sensor will
implement both techniques and the alarms from all
sensors will get correlated at a central control center.
This approach decreases the expectation on the accu-
racy of the threshold values, as correlation of alarms
from a multitude of sources can be used to eliminate
the false positives. The IDS sensors will be deployed
using easily configurable, lightweight computing plat-
forms like Soekris14 systems, connected back to a sin-
gle control station. We also plan to trial both the time
period based and the hybrid correlation techniques
mentioned above. The correlation engine will be en-
hanced to check anomalies in the AP’s RSS profile
just before an alarm is reported for a mobile station.
This will further help in keeping the false positives to
a minimum. We will also conduct experimentation in
scenarios where both the STA and the attacker are in
motion.
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